*Chapter 14*

# Political Science at Risk in Europe

## *Frailness and the Study of Power*

### David Paternotte and Mieke Verloo

During the summer of 2018, Victor Orban's government announced its intention to revoke the accreditation of gender studies programs, unjustly claiming gender studies to be "ideological" and graduates "not to be able to find jobs." This decision, imposed upon Hungarian academic authorities (including Central European University (CEU)), sparked massive international outcry but was finally adopted in October 2018, forcing both the CEU and Eötvös Loránd University to stop enrolling students for the next academic year.[1] This was not the first attack on academic freedom in the country (Helms & Kriszan, 2017; Pető, 2018). In recent years, CEU has been under assault regularly, a process that culminated with the adoption of the "Lex CEU" in 2017 (Trencsényi et al., 2017) and the forced relocation of CEU's teaching activities to Vienna in 2019. This institution was also forced to close down programs for registered refugees and asylum seekers and to stop research projects related to migration. Finally, Hungarian scholars have been regularly exposed in public debates, with lists of names published in media close to the government. It would be a mistake to attribute these attacks to the specificities of the institution under attack and to the kind of knowledge under scrutiny. Time has shown that these attacks were not restricted to CEU or to minority studies but belonged to wider efforts to increase centralization and state power in higher education (Craciun & Mihut, 2017; Enyedi, 2018). The attacks on CEU were rapidly followed by an assault on the institutional and financial autonomy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the country's main research institution, and applied this time to all fields of study including STEM and economics.[2] Important academic institutions like the post-1945 collections of the National Archives and the National Library were also forced to leave their premises without a clear relocation.

Hungary undoubtedly provides some of the most spectacular examples of recent attacks on academic freedom in Europe today. Yet, such assaults do not happen only in the so-called "illiberal" regimes but are part of a wider phenomenon of democratic backsliding (Cole, 2017; Pető, 2019; Stockemer & Kim, 2018). We contend that such attacks do not merely target political science, but social sciences and humanities as a wider field of knowledge and universities as specific social institutions. Ongoing political, social, and economic changes are closely intertwined with changes in the politics of knowledge. Researchers' freedoms of inquiry and expression are increasingly contested and power rulers show a growing interest in controlling research processes and outputs. Hostile public debates undermine the legitimacy of several fields of research and institutional autonomy is under threat in different parts of Europe. These transformations are further helped by structural—especially neoliberal—reforms of academia. Because of its object, political science appears as particularly frail when opposing power, and these changes are threatening its quality and future existence in Europe. It is therefore urgent for political science as a discipline to develop a strategic response to these challenges.

To apprehend the risks for political science in the current political landscape, we rely on the notion of academic freedom, defined by UNESCO as "the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and dissemination and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely opinions about the academic institution or system in which one works, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies."[3] Academic freedom depends on the observance of a set of rules in the process of knowledge production and on the relation between a scholar and a community of peers, which assesses collectively the validity of the knowledge produced in the field. This form of disciplinary validation avoids being controlled by an external institution such as the market or the state (Calhoun, 2009; Ménand, 1996; Scott, 2019). Academic freedom is strengthened by the upholding of institutional autonomy, that is the capacity of an academic institution to decide on its modes of organization and its priorities independently from the market or the state. Institutional autonomy can be either substantive (about the goals of an institution and the content of its programs) or procedural (about the process of decision-making over the goals and programs) (Aberbach & Christensen, 2017; Berdahl, 1990). Therefore, attacks on institutional autonomy as those on CEU and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences directly undermine the academic freedom of researchers active in both institutions. Academic freedom is also closely linked to the right to free expression for researchers (Calhoun, 2009). Indeed, if academic freedom and free speech imply different types of rights enjoyed by distinctive constituencies (academics in the first case, every citizen in the second one)

(Butler, 2018; Scott, 2019), researchers are expected to intervene in public debate more than average citizens because of their expertise (Göle, 2017).

In this chapter, we define political science as the study of power dynamics, both in the public sphere and more broadly. Politics can therefore not be examined without understanding the wider society in which they take place, and this chapter delves into the complex relationship between political science and its academic, political, and social context to highlight some of the risks that political sciences run into in these turbulent times. It also addresses the internal complexity of political science, which is made of numerous sub-disciplines, as power dynamics in current European societies affect political philosophy, international relations, gender and sexuality studies, minority studies or comparative politics differently. Finally, political science cannot be isolated from other social sciences, although these are not necessarily equally exposed to current political transformations. This piece offers a first exploration of the current situation in Europe, and tries to go beyond specific national case studies (Karran, 2010; Karran, Beiter, & Appiagyei-Atua, 2017). It relies on analyzing existing academic literature, the specialized press and reports by organizations such as Scholars at Risk and the European University Association, as well as informal exchanges with numerous colleagues across the continent. As will become clearer throughout this exploratory chapter, threats to political science in Europe cannot be dissociated from broader debates on academic freedom. In exploring the risks involved, the responses that can be detected, and those that we deem to be necessary for the future, we urge colleagues to become more and more visibly active in serious debates and actions in our profession.

This chapter starts with a reflection on political science as a discipline, and the implications of its oscillating relation to formal state power for its current and future quality. It then continues with exploring how political science is shaped by material resources and the relation of academia to the market and to market logics. The next section investigates the frames used to attack academic freedom, as well as the main tools and tactics used in this battle. After exposing how political science is at risk in Europe, we turn to actual and needed responses, before ending with a call for action resulting from our exploration and analysis.

## 1. THE PENDULUM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: ACCOMMODATION AND RESISTANCE TO POWER

Science is shaped by power and politics, an observation which holds true for political science as well (Ravecca, 2019). Indeed, the relations between political science and political power have constantly oscillated between two poles

with a differentiated impact on research access to politics and the political as well as on academic freedom. Like a pendulum, political science has swung between a pole aiming at knowledge production that supports existing power actors or institutions, and another pole aiming at providing a distanced critical analysis of the origins, dynamics, and impacts of existing power actors and institutions. While other disciplines such as law or economics have also been closely associated with the exercise of political power, political science appears as particularly exposed because of its unique ambition in dissecting and analyzing the actual workings of power.

Historically, drawing on the tradition of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the discipline has developed as a science of power and government, and it remains so in many contexts, as reminded by the numerous "schools of government" and the proximity to law in many countries. This feature makes political science attractive to the powerful who can regard it as a vehicle to consolidate power. Political science produces "political engineering" knowledge that can be used to justify and secure power. For example, Spanish political science significantly developed under Franco, with the key involvement of crucial figures of the regime (Jerez Mir, 2002). In this volume, Luciana Alexandra Ghica similarly reminds us the limits of scientific socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. If political science is very close to, intertwined with, or has not enough distance to political power, then constraints on academic freedom are likely to be expected. At the other end of the ideal-typical spectrum, political science has emancipated itself from the state. This emancipation has been encouraged by the production of more independent knowledge about political dynamics in academia, but also in social movements. From these movements came a strong impulse to expand the understanding of what constitute "politics" beyond the state and state-related actors. Socialist, feminist, and civil rights movements have broadened the study of politics to the politics in society at large, aiming at a critical reflection on the effects of formal and informal politics on society (such as the relation of politics to inequalities). This understanding of politics necessarily distances itself from actual political power, and when and where such a critical distance is not appreciated by actual political power, academic freedom may be at risk. Indeed, a more critical political science may appear as threatening to authoritarian powers and various attempts of *kulturkampf*, for it interrogates what is generally taken for granted in a society and unveils the actual working of power.

In Europe today, the study of formal politics remains dominant within the discipline, although political science research has for some time now reached out to the study of political dynamics outside formal political arenas such as parliaments, elections, governments, states, and supranational political institutions. At the same time, the discipline has clearly responded to the growing need to include the political dynamics of policymaking and policy implementation, and the political dynamics in other domains such as the

economy and the private sphere. All this implies that in the practice of political science as a discipline, one can find examples with elements situated all over the range of the pendulum between the critique of political power and the engineering of political power. Scholars who are situated close to political power can expect to enjoy good access to political actors and processes, at least as long as they remain visibly useful and deliver well-trained candidates for political and administrative positions. For them, the degree of academic freedom they can expect depends on the openness and the democratic nature of political power. To function properly, they need to be able to make their analyses public, even when critical of existing power. This mostly happens in democratic systems, as they provide the freedom and the absence of strong repercussions necessary to make this work. Defending broader and more critical forms of analysis, colleagues located at the other end of the spectrum are even more in need of a free and open society to function properly. They need a regime that allows societal and political dynamics to be observed, measured, analyzed, reflected upon, assessed, and debated publicly without personal risks or dangers. Finally, in between both ends of the spectrum stand researchers who articulate new types of critique or critical analyses of social and political phenomena that are highly salient in formal politics or highly polarized across the political spectrum. Those are highly vulnerable to direct attacks from political actors, and strongly in need of an open and democratic space to function properly.

All in all, whatever the exact position in the course of the pendulum, under the current conditions of strong political and social polarization, the innovative power of the discipline and its capacity to deliver knowledge that is most relevant to political life is significantly at risk. Regardless of the focus on formal politics or politics in a broader understanding, all political science needs is a democratic setting to function properly. Indeed, all innovative and critical political science relies on free speech and academic freedom. Furthermore, as argued by many authors, academic freedom is best defended in a democratic polity (Cole, 2017; Pető, 2019; Stockemer & Kim, 2018). Therefore, democracy appears as a vital condition for political science and a crucial prerequisite for its ongoing capacity of renewal. In other terms, the current backsliding of democracy in Europe may threaten the future of political science.

## 2. ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The future of political science is not only shaped by the kind of political regime, but also by economics and by the material resources available for research and teaching. The neoliberal turn and its impact on the emergence of academic

capitalism have crucially transformed universities and altered the space in which academics pursue their work (Mirowski, 2011). As argued by Craig Calhoun (2009), the restructuration of universities has profoundly impacted the conditions of academic freedom in Western countries, through interventions in university autonomy that weakened the capacity of universities to guarantee and promote their members' academic freedom and freedom of speech.

In a piece on academic freedom and performance-based research funding, Butler and Mulgan (2013) argue that academic freedom rests on four broad paradigms of independence: economic, institutional, social, and professional. All four are to some extent impacted by economy-related factors. Economic independence is the degree to which universities can make decisions about their functioning without being restricted strongly by budgetary concerns. The idea is that research choices should not result from economic power, just as they should not result from political power. However, for decades, the economic autonomy of universities has been under threat by defunding and austerity, either motivated politically or based on market considerations. Professional independence is the degree to which academic professionals can base their research and teaching decisions on their expertise, and their motivation to drive the discipline forward. It has been negatively impacted by the introduction of new public management style of leadership in universities, that is, giving the top management control through elaborate instruments of numerical quality measurement, monitoring, and rewards. Social independence refers to the degree to which universities and academics can depart from social and political expectations about what they should teach or research. For instance, war research is often driven by state and military concerns.[4] Strong populist accusations against universities and academics can inspire fear or evasion from certain topics and more, adaptation to the new public management. Finally, institutional independence is the degree to which an academic institution can make fundamental decisions about research and teaching. Here, apart from direct political interference, academic freedom can be encroached upon by increase of conditional money for which universities have to compete among each other under market conditions.

All this highlights how the neoliberal politics of academia have decreased institutional autonomy directly and indirectly, making universities less independent from the market and the state. These transformations have impacted negatively the capacity of universities and academics working within them to decide autonomously about their goals, content of programs and modus operandi of teaching and research. While this applies to academia in general, political science is seriously affected by these processes, and neoliberal mechanisms of decreasing institutional autonomy and academic freedom are also some of the tools used by authoritarian governments to further restrict academic freedom.

The notion of academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) insists on the ways public universities respond to neoliberal pressures rather than on what they end up as (that is neoliberal institutions). It highlights the shift toward managerial authority, accountability to economic productivity standards, quantitative performance auditing, and the instrumental use of research to serve national economic interests (Ferree & Zippel, 2015). In academia, such neoliberal changes have resulted in managerial governance, a stronger managerial class, commercialization of knowledge, and adapting corporate practices and ideologies to higher education (Deem, 2007; Tuchman, 2009). Academic capitalism has introduced norms and values that disrupt those of the classic liberal-humanistic university, including its elitist professorial authority relations, old boys' networks, and internalized disciplinary standards (Slaughter & Leslie, 1999). While the classic academic model was also flawed (for it was largely reflecting the interests of privileged populations), Ferree and Zippel (2015) rightly point out that neoliberalized academia has its own weaknesses and threats, and that it accepts and strengthens, rather than challenges, the bias toward economic and political elites that was present in the classic politics of knowledge.

Although academic capitalism has strong negative impacts, its effects are by no means homogeneous in Europe. Across countries, neoliberalism is a collection of nationally specific, importantly different projects with some common elements (Brenner, Beck, & Theodore, 2010). While problems result from a general underfunding of science in some countries, in others the main issue lies in the modes of allocation of resources. Another research project shows that there is both a general shift toward market models of governance and a differentiation across countries, and that the shift to a market model is more likely to lead to a loss of economic and professional autonomy (Dobbins & Knill, 2017).

Overall, the shift to market governance has had negative implications for academic freedom. The development of neoliberalism has led to an overall reduction of public funding for research and teaching, induced an increase of funding through projects, and made research and teaching more dependent on the market. This has reset criteria for quality and excellence through mimicking market competition dynamics in judging quality and excellence in research and teaching, at the expense of other criteria. The changing academic governance from relatively slower processes of internal co-optation, peer review, or academic democracy to fast-paced processes of new public management has further helped facilitate the exclusive use of economic productivity criteria in judging academic excellence and in promotion or granting possibilities. The new public management inspired procedures of hyper detailed monitoring have resulted in an academic panopticon, reducing the space for free thinking. These academic capitalism changes have

also led to a very substantial decrease of job security in academia, leading to an increase in academic precariousness, which further harms academic freedom.

## 3. ACADEMIA IN CHANGING DEMOCRACIES

Many have noticed an increased polarization of social and political debates in Europe (Ignatieff, 2018, p. 5). Debates are often trapped into binary oppositions, political opponents are described as enemies, violence against politicians is rising (Krook, 2017), all of which diminishes the likelihood of democratic debate between citizens or politicians at the opposite ends of political positions. Public debate is moving away from the Enlightenment ideal of a rational and democratic conversation in which people listen to each other and try to justify their arguments in reason. Moreover, as shown by the development of fake news and the role of emotions in social media hypes, truth and accuracy are no longer necessary requirements for public debate. Even if scholars have also unveiled the problematic assumptions historically underpinning this ideal of public rationality, and highlighted the positionality and the location of any producer of knowledge, these new developments harm the potential of truth claims based on rational inquiry. If scientific debates have never been democratic, insofar as they were necessarily based on the recognition of disciplinary vertical authority (Scott, 2019), they were ruled by a similar understanding of reason, and scientists have often contributed to social and political discussions on the basis of their expertise. The current developments that are detrimental to public debate are also harmful for knowledge production through science.

The newly developing new debate culture is linked to current attacks on academic freedom, inasmuch as both contribute to delegitimize science as a highly valued source of knowledge and expertise and threaten both the autonomy of science and its role in public debate. Scientists are no longer seen as the owners and producers of a type of knowledge judged as particularly valuable because of its distinctive modes of production and collective validation. Opinion and scholarship are often equated in the name of free speech, leading to a "worrisome relativizing of scholarship as 'opinions' in society at large" (Bracke, 2018). This type of attacks does not only happen in increasingly authoritarian regimes, but also in consolidated democratic societies. They are perpetrated by a wide range of actors, including states, university administrations, political party followers, citizens' groups, or media outlets. In this section, we highlight some of the frames used to attack academic freedom, as well as the tools and tactics used in this battle.

### 3.1. Framing Attacks on Science

An analysis of attacks on science across Europe has allowed us to identify five major frames currently circulating in Europe: they serve as the discursive foundation of this offensive on academia, and more specifically on social sciences and humanities. They are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in various ways: the "academics as elite" frame, the "absence of free speech for the Right" frame, the "identity politics" frame, the "cultural Marxism" frame, and the "academics are lazy" frame. Most attempt to destroy the truth claim of science by framing science as ideological. They are generally voiced from outside of academia by public intellectuals, media pundits, and politicians. When they are raised by scientists, the latter often speak outside of their discipline or area of expertise, as exemplified by the examples of Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1999) or by Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson in recent years. These frames do not only come from religious or far-right circles as one could expect, but can be warped into or disguised as a defense of Enlightenment (and positivism) against the fantasies and the illusions of "postmodernism."

The first frame—*academics as elite*—articulates a criticism with roots in the current populist wave. It opposes academics to average citizens, and portrays them as another privileged group or as belonging to the elites. It reclaims common sense against what is portrayed as pseudoscientific imaginations and accuses scientists of wasting taxpayer's money. Promoting anti-intellectualism, it depicts academics as people who have lost connection with "normal citizens" and do not understand everyday concerns. In brief, as claimed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan in response to the Academics for Peace's petition, academics are not necessarily enlightened and do not always pursue the common good (Erdogan, 15 January 2016, quoted in Özkirimli, 2017, p. 851). Former Belgian secretary of state for Asylum and Migration Theo Francken (NV-A) similarly responded to a joint letter sent by all Belgian university chancellors and to an open letter signed by more than 1,000 Belgian scholars, both asking for clarity in the murder of an underage asylum seeker by the police, by threatening them and emphasizing the gap between academic elites and average citizens around issues of migration[5] (see table 14.1).

**Table 14.1  Main Frames against Science**

| |
|---|
| Academics as elite |
| Absence of free speech for the Right |
| Identity politics |
| Cultural Marxism |
| Academics are unproductive |

A second frame—*absence of free speech for the Right*—invokes the concept of academic freedom to denounce how "political correctness" would impose restrictions on free speech in universities (for recent examples, see Bock-Côté, 2018; Griffiths, 2018; Legutko, 2016; Onfray, 2019). According to these critics, certain truths could no longer be said because they embarrass some groups with power, and universities are submitted to a new police of thought and language, a new kind of dictatorship. In the name of equality and nondiscrimination, it would actually lead to a normalization of knowledge and restrict the rights of certain groups, especially on the right. Often, critics denounce the imbalance between various types of discourse in academia and, by insisting on limitations to freedom of expression, they confuse academic freedom with free speech (Scott, 2017). Furthermore, they usually claim that "political correctness" is a U.S. import that threatens national culture and could dislocate the nation (Fassin, 2008). Often, academics are hence portrayed as "external agents, as enemies of the nation" (Göle, 2017, p. 876).

This frame is often combined with, and explained by, another one—the *identity politics* frame—that is, the claim that universities are confiscated by various sorts of minorities. Often used as a vague term coined to insist on the new political relevance of identities, "identity politics" serves here to target so-called minority studies, sometimes presented as "grievance studies."[6] According to detractors, these fields of research would endanger the universal and reuniting project of science the same way it undermines the unity of the people and the nation (Fukuyama, 2018; Lilla, 2017). They would also misuse the name of science to pursue political goals under cover, and are accused of promoting cultural relativism or political correctness and of misreading social complexity though binary—and hence ideological—frames such as of men/women, of blacks/whites, straight/gay, as well (paradoxically) as of those relying on postmodern foundations, which are often denigrated as "fake science" (Kuby, 2015; Ruse, 2017). As a result, universities would have become a dangerous space for white heterosexual men, who would be exposed to forms of discrimination.

Through a fourth frame—the *cultural Marxism* frame—several actors criticize the presumed intellectual power of the Left and its alleged domination over campuses. In this frame, since the cultural revolution of the 1960s, the Left would have massively invested academia, turning it into a hostile space for conservatives. This would have strengthened after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when former socialists understood that they need to fight in the field of ideas to conquer society. Again, knowledge is presented as a tool of power and this reading, which relies on a simplified version of Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, labels this strategy as "cultural Marxism." Recent debates in the Netherlands illustrate the relevance of such arguments. As argued by Verloo (2018), leading politicians of Thierry Baudet's Forum voor Democratie,

but also from Wilders' party, have repeatedly declared that universities and academics have been taken over by a leftist cabal propagating "cultural Marxism" as the entry point for Islamization. A recent controversy in Dutch politics in 2017, with parliamentary inquiries on this supposedly Left dominance, even resulted in a policy brief to the Dutch government on "Freedom of Academic science in the Netherlands" by the Dutch Royal Academy (KNAW) that concludes that there is no indication of serious restrictions to academic freedom in the Netherlands.[7] Similar debates also reached the Flemish press.[8]

These four frames are often combined with a fifth one, which is much more diffuse: "*academics are unproductive*." In many places, academics are presented as idle, unproductive, and therefore an expensive and unnecessary luxury. This depiction fits well into the elitist picture of academics of the first frame, turning academics into people wasting taxpayers' money. Moreover, there would be no reason to protect them if they pursue ideological enterprises instead of further developing science, as entailed in several of the other frames. Crucially, this frame also fits very well with neoliberal forms of bureaucratic control and competition for funding, as well as the abolishment of permanent positions, that can then be portrayed as a response or cure.

### 3.2. Repertoire of Action: The Main Weapons against Academic Freedom

These five frames are supported and embodied in a series of tools and tactics that have been spreading across Europe. This repertoire of action can be divided into two categories. Attacks can take the appearance of "business as usual" and engage with science management and university administration. Alternatively, they can wage the fight from outside academia. The weapons described in this sections have been used against a wide range of targets, including mainstream political science topics such as Brexit, terrorism, Islam, far-right parties, Israel-Palestine relations, environmental politics, or social movements.

Internal weapons against academic freedom fall into five categories (see table 14.2). First, as shown by the Hungarian attack on gender studies, *accreditation politics* are crucial. They allow politicians to decide on what is taught and to obstruct the development of entire fields of studies. In 2018,

**Table 14.2  Internal Weapons against Academic Freedom**

| |
|---|
| Accreditation politics |
| Funding |
| (Self)censorship |
| Department/university closure |
| Alternative academic venues |

Polish authorities also decided to erase ethnology and social anthropology as specific disciplines and to merge them into a new field called "the study of culture and religion."[9]

*Funding* is a second decisive means, with impact on both teaching and research. Recent examples show the various forms this weapon may adopt. Whole areas of research may be defunded, as happened to gender studies after Valérie Pécresse (LR)'s election as the president of the region Ile-de-France in 2015. Projects may also be rejected on political grounds, despite positive reviews or even after they had passed all the steps of the review process, as happened recently in Bulgaria (Darakchi, 2018).

Third, cases of *censorship and self-censorship* have been reported in many places. They can take the form of direct political interventions in the research process. For instance, in Italy, in December 2018, the Italian education minister blocked a research of the Università di Perugia on homophobic and racist school bullying funded by the Region of Umbria, because of disagreements with the questionnaire.[10] In April 2019, representatives of Lega Nord contacted the Università di Bologna because of a political science course using a book in which their party was labeled as far right and required the application of antidiscrimination regulations for right-wing students who could feel offended by such a reading.[11] In Poland, the government has—unsuccessfully—required university authorities to establish lists of scholars working in gender studies and, in 2017 in Britain, a Tory MP famously asked several British universities to provide lists of scholars teaching European affairs, particularly in relation to Brexit.[12]

In many cases, however, scholars or institutions themselves prefer not to engage in controversial research or teaching initiatives out of a fear for potential attacks (Aktas, Nilsson, & Borell, 2018; Kondakov, 2016). For this reason, scholars may revise the content of a program, a course, a syllabus, a seminar series, or a publication to make sure they do not contain anything that could be labeled as "problematic." This happened recently at the University of Zagreb with courses around gender and sexuality in human rights and in sociology, which were removed from the programs under the false argument of a lack of students. Similarly, in Britain, the content of some courses and the list of guest speakers have been amended to comply with the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act,[13] at the same requirements for ethical clearances were increased (Spiller, Awan, & Whiting, 2019).[14] Finally, various observers, from both left and right, have started to worry about the threats on academic freedom in result of the debates on safe spaces, trigger warnings, and micro aggressions, which are currently traveling from the United States and Australia to Europe.[15] By asking universities to protect students from the knowledge that could hurt them, these developments would infantilize students and obstruct critical thinking because of paternalism. Symptomatic of

the neoliberal university, these debates would imply the individualization of critical thinking on collective processes of oppression and pay too much attention to psychological harm and injury, diverting students from politics in favor of personal comfort (Scott, 2019; for a conservative critique, Furedi, 2017).

Fourth, *closing a department or an institution or threatening to do so*—by suspending or revoking its license—appears as a more extreme means to achieve similar objectives. CEU is not the only institution threatened with close down: the European University at Saint-Petersburg was temporarily closed down in 2008[16] and had no license for a bit more than a year between 2017 and 2018[17] (Dubrovskiy, 2017). Several departments have also been threatened or even been shut down under suspicions of political and ideological reasons, including some in Russia (Butterfield & Levintova, 2011) and Israel.[18] Institutions are not the only victims and, as shown by the dramatic example of Turkey, where at least 8,535 university staff members lost their job (SAR, 2018), critical colleagues may also be disciplined or even dismissed by higher education authorities, especially when they are not tenured. Not promoting them is another strategy, as recently reported in the Czech Republic.[19]

Finally, *creating alternative academic venues* is another strategy to engage in the production of academic knowledge. These include the creation of new departments or institutions, such as Marion Maréchal-Le Pen's "Institut des sciences sociales, économiques et politiques de Lyon," publishing houses and even journals such as *The Natural Family: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, which is run by the anti-choice World Congress of Families and has recently published a speech by Victor Orban, and research results by controversial U.S. sociologist Mark Regnerus.

Six external means of action, as they take place mostly outside of academic and administrative circuits, must be discussed (see table 14.3). First, "*public online target harassment*" (Ferber, 2018), *stalking, ad hominem attacks, and physical and death threats* have become a common experience for many colleagues, especially on Twitter and other social media. A bomb alert against the Swedish Secretariat for Gender Research was even reported in Gothenburg in 2018.[20] Such threats happen in many countries (Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands,

**Table 14.3   External Weapons against Academic Freedom**

| |
|---|
| Harassment, stalking, personal threats, and attacks |
| Naming, blaming, blacklisting scholars/disciplines |
| Protest |
| Recording |
| Constraints on freedom of circulation |
| Policing and prosecution |

Turkey, etc.) and colleagues working on the far right, Islam, or migration are particularly at risk, along with women and minorities (Savigny, 2019).

Second, *naming, blaming, and blacklisting* scholars and disciplines, online or in the press, have become common practices in Europe. If Hungarian or Turkish lists have been widely publicized, France has experienced a similar phenomenon in relation to the (timid) development of post- and decolonial studies. Leading public intellectuals (including Elisabeth Badinter, Alain Finkielkraut, and Pierre Nora) have publicly warned against the alleged dangers of this field of study,[21] and major media outlets like *Le Point*, *Le Nouvel Observateur* or *Le Figaro* have published detailed accounts of the activities of these supposedly dangerous colleagues.[22] Specific websites, sometimes run by (former) scholars, watch research activities, like the German website Sciencefiles. In Britain and the Netherlands, critical academics have been regularly exposed in the press (Miller, Mills & Harkins, 2011; Moors, 2018).

This trend may be accompanied by the delegitimizing of entire fields of study. For instance, in 2015 and 2016, former French prime minister Manuel Valls has—along with other French public figures—repeatedly accused sociology of promoting a "culture de l'excuse," that is, of justifying mischief (including terrorism) and exonerating perpetrators of part of their responsibility through attempts of understanding their motivations and the context in which these acts are perpetrated (Bronner & Géhin, 2017; Lahire, 2016). Similarly, in many countries, researchers on Islam, who are often denigrated though the use of the derogatory term "islamo-leftists," are accused of being too benevolent toward their object of study and the alleged radicalization of part of the Muslim community.[23]

Third, *protest* against academic events or specific courses[24] has increased. In February 2019, Polish nationalists severely disturbed a conference on the Shoah organized at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, forcing the president of the school to write an open letter to the Polish ambassador and to contact judicial authorities and the French government to contact its Polish counterpart.[25] Although this incident was particularly dramatic, it is not the first-time activists try to disturb an academic event. In October 2017, the authorities of the University Lyon 2 canceled a conference on islamophobia under pressures from both far-right and secularist groups.[26] Similar forms of protest led the head of the University of Verona to cancel a conference on LGBT asylum seekers in May 2018.[27] States may sometimes pressure the organizers of academic events, as happened in July 2018 at the Jewish Museum of Berlin with the cancellation of a lecture about being Queer and Palestinian in East-Jerusalem because of support to Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS).[28] Finally, such attacks are not exclusively fomented by right-wing groups, as happened with several academic events on surrogacy or sex work in Spain in 2019 or on trans rights in the United Kingdom since 2018.[29]

Fourth, various groups encourage students to *record* controversial lecturers[30] and to *report* their ideas and activities, for instance, to specific websites or hotlines. Dutch politician Thierry Baudet offered one of the most recent examples of this strategy. Following the statement made in the speech following his electoral victory in the 2019 provincial elections that universities are one of the forces undermining the Netherlands,[31] the Forum voor Democratie announced the establishment of a hotline against indoctrination where pupils and students can denounce their teachers before freezing the initiative for concerns related to breach of privacy.[32]

Fifth, constraints on the *freedom of circulation* for researchers exist in different countries, preventing them from leaving the country, even to attend conferences. This strategy is common in Turkey against academics who signed the Academics for Peace petition. Israel has also restricted access to visiting scholars supporting BDS. The reverse strategy, forcing academics to leave their country to pursue their activities, has also been reported in Turkey, in Russia, and increasingly in Hungary. In some countries like Russia or Hungary, state officials also claim to combat the influence of foreign education in higher education (Dubrovskiy, 2017).

Finally, *legal and police means*, including blackmail, surveillance, prosecution, and incarceration, have been used against scholars, Turkey being the most dramatic example, with several hundreds of university employees and students arrested since January, and thousands of staff members dismissed, leading to cases of "civil deaths" (Aktas, Nilsson, & Borell, 2018; see also Baser, Akgönül, & Öztürk, 2017).[33] It takes less spectacular forms in most European countries. Several researchers have been attacked and sometimes prosecuted for the use of private data acquired without the consent of its owner, threatened with legal action for defamation because they had raised concerns of plagiarism or suggested a line of analysis which was not shared by the interviewees or because they have used their knowledge to support a cause they believe in, as happened with several law and political science professors advising the Catalan government on the 2017 independence referendum.[34]

## 4. HOW TO RESPOND?

European political scientists deserve better responses, in terms of both prevention and protection. It is urgent to prevent that more colleagues become "scholars at risk," and there is a need for protection at institutional, collective, and individual levels. As recent events have shown in different parts of the region, it is a serious mistake to treat statements of intention about the politics of knowledge, academia, research, and teaching, social sciences and

humanities by politicians and other powerful actors as "just talk." Moreover, against the belief that academic institutions are strong and resilient, recent events have exposed their fragility and the speed with which they can be attacked and dismantled. It is of the highest urgency to study the actors and dynamics behind the attacks, and to revise our assumptions about the state of academic freedom in Europe (Gessen, 2017).[35]

On the one hand, this requires better knowledge. Instead of assuming that we know already what is happening, we need to collect more empirics, to adjust and to refine our theories, and to confront more systematically our analytical frames to new political and social developments. We need knowledge on oppositional frames, tactics and tools, and the way they travel across borders, for the case of Hungary indicates, for instance, a diffusion of bad practices from Israel, Poland, and Russia. We should also trace more carefully how neoliberal reforms have provided a fertile ground for recent attacks. Finally, we need to articulate research on academic freedom to the flourishing literature on the growth of populism, nationalism, and the far right in Europe, as well as study more thoroughly the interactions between de-democratization or democratic backsliding and attacks or restrictions to academic freedom to detect possible feedback loops (Verloo, 2018).

Better knowledge also implies a better understanding of the articulation between academic freedom and freedom of speech: for instance, academic freedom and rights of political expression converge when academics who speak "extramurally" suffer retaliation or punishment within the university or are threatened with the loss of their positions (Butler, 2017). Finally, we have to produce more knowledge on effective political pressure (lobbying, networking, interventions in public debates) to keep the space for academic reflection on political turbulence open.

On the other hand, it is crucial to improve the protection of political scientists against such attacks, not only when these happen but also preemptively. Such protection requires the intervention of various types of actors, improved interactions between political, institutional, and professional levels, and coalitions across countries and disciplines to break the isolation of some scholars and to overcome national logics (Bouvart, De Proost, & Norocel, 2018).

At political level, European states and supranational institutions must play a more proactive role, both within Europe and beyond. Building on the work of UNESCO mentioned earlier, we need stronger international standards for academic freedom, and indicators, milestones, and monitoring systems to follow closely what is happening in Europe. These institutions also need to ensure political scientists can still work in increasing authoritarian or illiberal contexts such as Hungary or Turkey, which implies the development of measures to be deployed to enforce these standards and sanctions for those who infringe them.

Given its competences and legacy in research policy, the European Union (EU) should play a leading role. However, this has not been the case until now. The strong dependence on high competition for the allocation of its research money has strengthened neoliberal understandings of individual excellence instead of solidarity. Moreover, while the Parliament has repeatedly raised the issue, the European Commission has been particularly mild when condemning attacks on academic freedom in Hungary. Among what could be done, we would like to emphasize three ideas that would fit well within the EU's research policy. First, calls for applications could include requirements on academic freedom and institutional autonomy, echoing what has been done with gender equality. Second, direct funding could be devoted to research on understanding breaches of academic freedom in Europe. Third, the European Research Area must be consolidated across the East-West and North-South divide. Indeed, European states have a large responsibility to enforce broader conditions for academic freedom and institutional autonomy, but their track record so far is weak, and some states are among the biggest offenders. Therefore, more equality across European states is needed to avoid having (social) science deserts.

At the academic level, universities and group of universities, such as the newly created "European universities" and leagues and organizations as different as the European University Association (EUA), the Russell Group, or the Network of Universities from the Capitals of Europe (UNICA), must ensure their employees are adequately protected against potential attacks and provide them with adequate institutional responses whenever it is the case. This implies the development of protocols and worst-case scenarios, as well as sufficient provisions of financial, legal, security, psychological, and social support. A thorough reflection on how to decrease risks is also urgent (for instance, when scholars are urged by their institution to become active on platforms such as Twitter without proper training about the dangers it entails).

Academic institutions can also be instrumental in building concrete forms of solidarities with colleagues in more hostile contexts, for instance by issuing clear statements condemning attacks on academic freedom. Statements can also be part of lobbying strategies, both to increase pressure on problematic governments or institutions and to ask political institutions to intervene. For instance, in addition to statements on individual worrying cases like Hungary, All European Academies (ALLEA), the European University Association (EUA) and Science Europe issued a joint statement on 10 April 2019 on the urgent need to back commitments to academic freedom and university autonomy with solid actions,[36] and also support together the need for "stronger human and societal approaches across the new Horizon Europe program."[37] Statements are also regularly made by single institutions, and

some have even developed policies to ensure a representation at trials against scholars in countries such as Turkey.

Fellowship programs for scholars at risk offer another way of achieving concrete solidarity.[38] These may be restricted to scholars from specific countries or disciplines or be open more broadly and are offered by various institutions in Europe today, such as the Réseau français des instituts d'études avancées (RFEIA, French network of Institutes for Advanced Studies) and the Université libre de Bruxelles. These grants are however often of limited duration and remain scarce in Europe, raising concerns about the future of scholars at risk once they terminate their fellowship. Broader and more ambitious international solidarity schemes are needed, be it as grants or in other forms, and several initiatives must be mentioned. In France, the Pause Program (Programme national d'aide à l'accueil en urgence des scientifiques en exil) was created in 2017 to welcome scholars at risk in French academic institutions.[39] Hosted at the Collège de France and supported by the French State, it aims at welcoming 100 scholars at risk per year. Under a different model, the Philipp Schwartz Program at Humboldt Foundation pursue a similar goal in Germany with the support of Federal authorities and various foundations.[40] The NGO Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA) gathers a network of 119 U.K. universities to protect academic freedom and welcome scholars at risk in Britain. It is helped by numerous foundations and social actors.[41]

At professional level, national, European, and international scientific organizations such as the ECPR have a tremendous responsibility in protecting the field and those who practice it. First, access to ECPR conferences and activities must be ensured or enabled, also for colleagues from endangered contexts. This implies paying more attention to cross-national inequalities in higher education, economic disparities, and sometimes visa issues, as well as looking for more concrete solutions than the rhetorical mantra of academic excellence. A policy of avoiding countries and institutions known for not upholding academic freedom could also be more systematically implemented.

Professional organizations could also be spaces to gather and exchange knowledge and solutions, for instance through the setting up of an observatory of academic freedom or a helpdesk for scholars at risk in Europe. This aim could be pursued with organizations from different countries and disciplines. Professional organizations could also offer fora to raise awareness of these attacks among scholars, the media, and social and political actors more generally. They could finally promote the public role of political science as a strategy to avoid a break with citizens and social and political actors in specific countries. Lastly, professional organizations should act to protect their members against their own institutions when these are not complying with their obligations or cannot act in systems of direct dependency on hostile state authorities.

Having said all this, critical self-reflection is also required, for political science can only endure if it considers its own limits. These include a lack of diversity and inclusiveness, blindness to social inequalities within the profession, a burdensome legacy of colonialism and Eurocentrism, wide inequalities in access to the discipline and in the organization of the discipline, and—often—a lack of transparent forms of internal governance. A thorough interrogation of disciplinary divides and further promotion of interdisciplinarity are also needed, especially as many opponents do not make complex distinctions about who belongs to what. Further work on ethics, integrity, and transparency is required, especially in light of the pressures faced by scholars under neoliberalism.

Backing up our recommendations for responses, we conclude that it is urgent to lose our naivety when facing our increasingly less bright future and to further investigate the threats that seriously endanger the discipline. These are also attacks against scholars, and we need to face and understand them instead of behaving like ostriches and keeping quiet until the storm will be gone. To achieve this goal, it is urgent for political scientists to reflect on the purpose of their discipline: What should political sciences be for and for whom? This would offer a stronger base and vision from which to act against current attacks.

## NOTES

1. At least for their Hungarian programs: https://www.newsweek.com/hungarys-leader-orban-bans-gender-studies-all-universities-because-its-not-1174069?fbclid=IwAR05Hs1djM7HB6FxyBt-PJHAiuX1zzyW2y3oy48BoyJPaftY2w16T7B42jw.

2. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02107-4?fbclid=IwAR022Yx5eZAzzbLR5fspA3ijZEKbNXcbvICYUdu1yGBsuM5XpWS_Go7Dt6g&_ga=2.144915956.1379537620.1562610032-1005911596.1559666081.

3. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000109075.

4. https://zilsel.hypotheses.org/3052.

5. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180608_03551810.

6. https://areomagazine.com/2018/10/02/academic-grievance-studies-and-the-corruption-of-scholarship/.

7. https://www.knaw.nl/nl/actueel/publicaties/vrijheid-van-wetenschapsbeoefening-in-nederland. The report states that academic freedom could be threatened by the preference for societal impact of research and funding by third parties can lead to some restrictions or unwanted interference of research.

8. https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190920_04619294?articlehash=3390F384E257555F7954758283930F2AC9722781DE03B9EA2F83F4E24C2B85ABA74DD9A59B6957B1E3E9A6C3D33E514CC283C8F7CA0A3FAA394395CAD24F30B2.

9. http://www.anthropology-news.org/index.php/2018/12/07/erasing-polish-anthropology/.

10. https://www.corriere.it/cronache/18_dicembre_09/umbria-questionario-gender-pillon-lega-fa-bloccare-ricerca-sull-omofobia-058c7ba2-fbab-11e8-b5c8-9e33310709fc.shtml.

11. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/italy-far-right-salvini-lega-league-university-bologna-fascism-a8870736.html.

12. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/oct/24/universities-mccarthyism-mp-demands-list-brexit-chris-heaton-harris.

13. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/nov/11/reading-university-warns-danger-left-wing-essay.

14. Regulations limiting the action of social movements have also been used against those studying them: for instance, http://www.notav.info/post/studiare-il-movimento-notav-e-considerato-criminale/.

15. https://www.newstatesman.com/education/2014/10/why-uk-universities-must-steer-clear-trigger-warnings; https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/feb/02/government-tells-universities-to-protect-free-speech-on-campus.

16. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/closure-of-european-university-at-st-petersburg-dead-cert/.

17. https://eu.spb.ru/en/news/19178-375-days-without-a-license?fbclid=IwAR3ffMBX8xNfYKseN9st2hRk9nzIeoP62y3UVU4HMP3rH65lwijKK2_X_kA.

18. http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2012/09/academic-freedom-attacked-in-israel/.

19. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/czech-president-blocks-professorships-academic-critics.

20. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/swedish-model-dismantled-premature-closure-of-gender-equality/.

21. https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/le-decolonialisme-une-strategie-hegemonique-l-appel-de-80-intellectuels-28-11-2018-2275104_20.php.

22. https://www.nouveau-magazine-litteraire.com/université/la-guerre-du-canon-n'aura-pas-lieu.

23. https://plus.lesoir.be/79159/article/2017-01-25/gilles-kepel-luniversite-est-soumise-des-pressions-islamo-gauchistes.

24. Like the course on the history of homosexuality created at the Università di Torino in 2019 (https://www.vice.com/it/article/bj7mgz/storia-omosessualita-forza-nuova-torino) or the one on identity politics from a literature and queer perspective at the University of Sofia (https://www.uni-sofia.bg/index.php/bul/novini/novini_i_s_bitiya/svobodata_e_v_rhovna_cennost_zaschitata_na_svobodata_v_rhoven_d_lg).

25. https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/03/01/un-colloque-sur-l-histoire-de-la-shoah-perturbe-par-des-nationalistes-polonais_5429753_3224.html.

26. https://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2017/10/11/l-annulation-d-un-colloque-universitaire-sur-l-islamophobie-fait-debat-a-lyon_5199309_1653130.html.

27. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/academic-freedom-under-threat-workshop-on-lgbt-asylum-is-cen/.

28. https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Israels-ambassador-convinces-Berlins-Jewish-Museum-to-cancel-BDS-speaker-563220.

29. https://www.pikaramagazine.com/2019/05/manifiesto-contra-la-quema-de-brujas-y-las-practicas-inquisitoriales-de-ciertas-plataformas-feministas/; https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Universidad-Coruna-suspende-jornadas-criticas_0_941056797.html.

30. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/online-intimidation-left-biased-academics-spreads-worldwide.

31. http://www.advalvas.vu.nl/nieuws/forum-voor-democratie-wil-extreem-linkse-hoogleraren-vervangen?fbclid=IwAR3u2Upgu4cq6SF7UyIydVvGPFYBiPytFlHzw0mMM8C7VA3gGbvntZuZYeY.

32. https://nos.nl/artikel/2277889-onderwijs-en-politiek-vallen-hard-over-meldpunt-indoctrinatie.html?fbclid=IwAR1u_4eRKBAHsiYol7JAO4Bs8OVTtDyPsUO9s5ttFKV6fb_D3ObJfOEn4PY.

33. For numbers: https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Scholars-at-Risk-Letter-Brief-on-Turkey-2018.01.15.pdf.

34. https://eldebatedehoy.es/politica/proces-comunidad-cientifica/.

35. Masha Gessen's (2017) rules are: Believe the autocrat; Do not be taken in by small signs of normality; institutions will not save you; Be outraged; Pay attention to the ways in which the Trump presidency breaks the moral compass; Remember the future.

36. https://allea.org/allea-eua-and-science-europe-publish-joint-statement-on-academic-freedom-and-institutional-autonomy/.

37. https://eua.eu/downloads/publications/universities-united-for-the-best-horizon-europe.pdf.

38. See the project Academic Dugnad, a term first used by the University of Oslo, targeting refugee scholars and students. It is promoted by UNICA: http://www.unica-network.eu/category/content/academic-dugnad-refugees-academia.

39. https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/programme-pause/index.htm.

40. https://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/philipp-schwartz-initiative-en.html.

41. https://www.cara.ngo.

# REFERENCES

Aberbach, J. D., & Christensen, T. (2017). Academic autonomy and freedom under pressure: Severely limited, or alive and kicking? *Public Organization Review, 18*(4), 487–506.

Aktas, V., Nilsson, M., & Borell, K. (2019). Social scientists under threat: Resistance and self-censorship in Turkish academia. *British Journal of Educational Studies, 67*(2), 169–86.

Awan, I., Spiller, K., & Whiting, A. (2019). *Terrorism in the classroom. Security, surveillance and a public duty to act*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Baser, B., Akgönül, S., & Öztürk, A. E. (2017). "Academics for peace" in Turkey: A case of criminalizing dissent and critical thought via counterterrorism policy. *Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10*(2), 274–96.

Berdahl, R. (1990). Academic freedom, autonomy and accountability in British universities. *Studies in Higher Education, 15*(2), 169–80.

Bock-Côté, M. (2019). *L'empire du politiquement correct*. Paris: Editions du Cerf.

Bouvart, A., De Proost, M., & Norocel, O. V. (2018). I've got a gender and I do not hesitate to use it. *Journal of the International Network for Sexual Ethics and Politics*. Forthcoming. Retrieved from https://www.insep.ugent.be

Bracke, S. (2018). *Peterson on campus: Thinking through the failures*. Paper presented at the AISSR lunch: public speaking and debate in academia.

Brenner, N., Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Variegated neoliberalization: Geographies, modalities, pathways. *Global Networks, 10*(2), 182–222.

Bronner, G., & Géhin, E. (2017). *Le danger sociologique*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

Butler, J. (2017). Academic freedom and the critical task of the University. *Globalizations, 14*(6), 857–61.

Butler, J. (2018). What is free and open inquiry? Academic freedom and political expression. Keynote lecture delivered at the Scholars at Risk Global Congress in Berlin. Retrieved from https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/resources/prof-dr-judith-butler-university-of-california-berkeley-what-is-free-and-open-inquiry-academic-freedom-and-political-expression-keynote/

Butler, P., & Mulgan, R. (2013). Can academic freedom survive performance-based research funding. *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 44*, 487–520.

Butterfield, J., & Levintova, E. (2011). Academic freedom and international standards in higher education: Contestation in journalism and political science at Moscow State University. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 44*(4), 329–41.

Cole, J. R. (2017). Academic freedom as an indicator of a liberal democracy. *Globalizations, 14*(6), 862–68.

Craciun, D., & Mihut, G. (2017). Requiem for a dream: Academic freedom under threat in democracies. *International Higher Education, 90*, 15–16.

Darakchi, S. (2018). Emergence and development of LGBTQ studies in post-socialist Bulgaria. *Journal of Homosexuality*. doi:10.1080/00918369.2018.1534413.

Deem, R. (2007). Managing a meritocracy or an equitable organisation? Senior managers' and employees' views about equal opportunities policies in UK universities. *Journal of Education Policy, 22*(6), 615–36.

Dobbins, M., & Knill, C. (2017). Higher education governance in France, Germany, and Italy: Change and variation in the impact of transnational soft governance. *Policy and Society, 36*(1), 67–88.

Dubrovskiy, D. (2017). Escape from freedom: The Russian academic community and the problem of academic rights and freedoms. *Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 3*(1), 171–89.

Enyedi, Z. (2018). Democratic backsliding and academic freedom in Hungary. *Perspectives on Politics, 16*(4), 1067–74.

Fassin, E. (2008). L'empire du genre. L'histoire politique ambiguë d'un outil conceptuel. *L'Homme, 187–188*, 375–92.

Ferber, A. L. (2018). "Are you willing to die for this work?" Public targeted online harassment in higher education. *Gender & Society, 32*(3), 301–20.

Fukuyama, F. (2018). *Identity: The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Furedi, F. (2016). *What's happened to the university? A sociological exploration of its infantilization*. London: Routledge.

Gessen, M. (2017, 8 November). One year after Trump's election, revisiting "Autocracy: Rules for survival." *New Yorker*.

Göle, N. (2017). Undesirable public intellectuals. *Globalizations, 14*(6), 877–83.

Griffiths, R. (Ed.). (2018). *Political correctness. Dyson and Goldberg vs. Fry and Peterson. The Munk Debates*. Toronto: House of Anansi.

Helm, E., & Krizsan, A. (2017). Hungarian government's attack on Central European University and its implications for gender studies in Central and Eastern Europe. *Femina Politica, 2*, 169–73.

Ignatieff, M. (2018). Academic freedom from without and within. In M. Ignatieff & S. Roch (Eds.), *Academic freedom: The global challenge* (pp. 1–10). Budapest: CEU Press.

Jerez Mir, M. (2002). La constitution de la science politique espagnole. *Pôle Sud, 16*, 157–71.

Karran, T. (2009). Academic freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO's Recommendation. *British Journal of Educational Studies, 57*(2), 191–215.

Karran, T., Beiter, K., & Atua, K. A. (2017). Measuring academic freedom in Europe: A criterion referenced approach. *Policy Reviews in Higher Education, 1*(2), 209–39.

Kondakov, A. (2016). Teaching queer theory in Russia. *QED: A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking, 3*(2), 107–18.

Krook, M. L. (2017). Violence against women in politics. *Journal of Democracy, 28*(1), 74–88.

Kuby, G. (2015). *The global sexual revolution: Destruction of freedom in the name of freedom*. Brooklyn: Angelico Press.

Lahire, B. (2016). *Pour la sociologie. Et pour en finir avec une prétendue "culture de l'excuse."* Paris: La Découverte.

Legutko, R. (2016). *The demon in democracy: Totalitarian temptations in free societies*. New York: Encounter Books.

Lilla, M. (2017). *The once and future liberal: After identity politics*. New York: HarperCollins.

Ménand, L. (1996). The limits of academic freedom. In L. Ménand (Ed.), *The future of academic freedom* (pp. 3–19). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mills, D., Mills, T., & Harkins, S. (2011). Teaching about terrorism in the United Kingdom: How it is done and what problems it causes. *Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4*(3), 405–20.

Mirowski, P. (2011). *Science-mart: Privatizing American science.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Moors, A. (2019). No escape: The force of the security frame in academia and beyond. In N. Fadil, F. Ragazzi, & M. de Koning (Eds.), *Radicalization in Belgium and The Netherlands: Critical perspectives on violence and security* (pp. 245–61). London: I.B. Tauris.

Onfray, M. (2019). *Théorie de la dictature*. Paris: Robert Laffont.

Özkirimli, U. (2017). How to liquidate a people? Academic freedom in Turkey and beyond. *Globalizations, 14*(6), 851–56.

Pető, A. (2018). Attack on freedom of education in Hungary. The case of gender studies. *Engenderings*. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2018/09/24/attack-on-freedom-of-education-in-hungary-the-case-of-gender-studies/

Pető, A. (2019). Intellectual Freedom and its new enemies. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eastern-european-governments-attack-scientific-knowledge-by-andrea-peto-2019-02

Ravecca, P. (2019). *The politics of political science. Re-writing Latin American experiences*. New York: Routledge.

Ruse, A. (2017). *Fake science: Exposing the Left's skewed statistics, fuzzy facts, and dodgy data*. Washington: Regnery.

Savigny, H. (2019). The violence of impact: Unpacking relations between gender, media and politics. *Political Studies Review*. doi:10.1177/1478929918819212.

Scott, J. W. (2017). On free speech and academic freedom. *Journal of Academic Freedom, 8*. Retrieved from https://www.aaup.org/JAF8/free-speech-and-academic-freedom#.XObEwi_pOL9

Scott, J. W. (2019). *Knowledge, power and academic freedom*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. (1999). *Academic capitalism: Politics, policies and the entrepreneurial university*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sokal, A., & Bricmont, J. (1999). *Fashionable nonsense: Postmodern intellectuals' abuse of science*. New York: Picador.

Stockemer, D., & Kim, M. (2018). Introduction: Academic freedom in danger: Case studies of Turkey, Hungary and Japan. *European Political Science*. doi:10.1057/s41304-018-0172-9.

Trencsényi, B., Rieber, A. J., Iordachi, C., & Hîncu, A. (2017). Academic freedom in danger. Fact files on the "CEU Affair." *Südosteuropa, 65*, 412–67.

Tuchman, G. (2009). *Wannabe U: Inside the corporate university*. University of Chicago Press.

Verloo, M. (2018). Gender knowledge, and opposition to the feminist project: Extreme-right populist parties in the Netherlands. *Politics and Governance, 6*(3). doi:10.17645/pag.v6i3.1456.